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SOUTH IOWA METHODIST HOMES, INC. v. BOARD OF
REVIEW: TAX EXEMPTION OF CHARITABLE
PROPERTY IN COURSE OF CONSTRUCTION
Undeterred by the doctrine of strict construction applicable to
tax exemption statutes, the Supreme Court of Iowa, in South Iowa
Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Board of Review,' granted exemption to
land and a building in the course of construction owned by a
charitable institution. This result conformed with a pending
amendment to Iowa's tax exemption statute 2 providing for exemption of charitable property while in the course of construction.
This Note will evaluate South Iowa in light of the conflicting case
law presented and the policy behind the exemption of charitable
property.
Plaintiffs applied for tax exemption of its land and a building
while it was under construction. When completed the building
was to be used as a home for the elderly. The pertinent portion of
the Iowa statute exempted all grounds and buildings "used" by
charitable institutions for their "appropriate objects."'3 It was stipulated that the land and building, when completed and occupied,
would qualify for exemption under the statute. Whether exemption could be granted under these particular facts depended upon
the interpretation of the word "used" in the statute.
Involved in the decision was a balancing of various factors
regarding the exemption of property from taxation. As a general
4
proposition taxation is the rule and exemption the exception.
Thus statutes passed for the purpose. of exempting property must be
strictly construed and all doubts resolved in favor of taxation.
Applying these principles, it would appear that the Iowa statute
exempted charitable property only when actually used. On the
other hand, by providing for exemption of charitable property,
the legislature obviously intended to encourage the charitable use
of property. If the doctrine of strict construction necessitates a
narrow interpretation excluding exemption under these facts, the
obvious intent of the legislature would be defeated by adding costs
to those charities seeking to make a charitable use of their property.
1.

136 N.W.2d 488 (Iowa 1965).

2.

IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 427.1(9) (1949) as amended by IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 427.1(9) (Supp. 1965). The amendment was approved on June 4, 1965
and will take effect July 4, 1966.
3. IOWA CODE ANN. § 427.1(9) (1949) provides in part that the following classes of property shall not be taxed:
Property of religious, literary, and charitable societies. All grounds
and buildings used by . . . charitable, benevolent, . . . and religious institutions and societies solely for their appropriate objects.
4. See e.g., Cornell College v. Board of Review, 248 Iowa 338, 81 N.W.
2d 25 (1957); Trustees of Iowa College v. Baillie, 236 Iowa 235, 17 N.W.2d
143 (1945); Wagner v. Board of Review, 232 Iowa 58, 4 N.W.2d 405 (1942).
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In reversing the lower court and granting the exemption, the
court said:
[I]t is in accord with legislative intent, more consistent
with our own decisions, and not contrary to any general
rule in other jurisdictions to hold that property, which will
be exempt under section 427.1 (9) when a building being
erected thereon is completed and occupied, is also exempt
during the construction period. 5
Initially, it was questioned whether the statute was not so plain
on its face as to provide for exemption without resort to judicial
interpretation. 6 The use of the land for construction of the building might constitute an "appropriate object" in itself, thus exempting the land from assessment. The partially completed building
was subject to taxation as part of the land.7 If the land were
exempt there would be no basis upon which to tax the building.
The court, however, did not pursue this line of reasoning. Rather
the issue was reduced to its proper perspective and was considered
in the light of the policies which gave rise to the statute. A possible
barrier to exemption in South Iowa was the rule of strict construction of exemption statutes. As one court in denying exemption under facts similar to those in South Iowa stated: "Statutes granting
exemptions from taxation are strictly construed to the end that
such concession will be neither enlarged nor extended beyond the
plain meaning of the language employed. ' 8 While recognizing that
strict construction of tax exemption statutes severely limits exemption in doubtful cases, the court rejected the Board's contention
that under a strict construction the word "used" could not be
construed to mean "to be used." 9
Some doubt arose as to whether the rule of strict construction
was even applicable in this case. Section 4.2 of the code provided
that the "provisions and all proceedings" under the code be construed liberally "with a view to promote its objects and assist the
parties in obtaining justice." 10 The South Iowa court reasoned that
although the legislature did not intend a liberal construction when
deciding whether a charitable activity satisfied the "appropriate object" requirement, once the project was considered within the statute on this basis, Section 4.2 called for a liberal construction.1' This
5. South Iowa Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Board of Review, 136 N.W.2d
at 492.
6. 136 N.W.2d at 489.
7. See Wagner v. Board of Review, 232 Iowa 58, 4 N.W.2d 405 (1945).
8. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal.2d 729, 734,
221 P.2d 31, 34 (1950).
9. South Iowa Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Board of Review, 136 N.W.2d
at 489.
10. IOWA CODE ANN. § 4.2 (1949). This section provides:
The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof
are to be strictly construed, has no application to this code. Its
provisions and all proceedings under it shall be liberally construed

with a view to promote its objects and assist the parties in obtaining justice.
11. 136 N.W.2d at 489-90.
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reasoning was not supported by authority. Furthermore, section
4.2 is not specifically directed to the code provisions on taxation.
It is a general rule of construction applicable throughout the code.
Section 4.2 appears to be aimed at negating the common law rule of
construction that all statutes in derogation of the common law are
to be strictly construed. It seems clear that such a construction
would have conflicted with the established rule of strict construc12
tion of exemption statutes enunciated in previous Iowa decisions.
In any event, it appears that the South Iowa court did not
adopt the rule of liberal construction and granted exemption despite the doctrine of strict construction. Colorado has liberally
construed its exemption statute and granted exemption to property
in the court of construction. 13 The court in South Iowa, however,
rejected these cases 14 because the Colorado court had utilized a
liberal construction of its tax exemption statute.
Speaking in favor of exemption in South Iowa were the anomalies which would arise if exemption were denied. In National Bank
of Burlington v. Huenke, 15 the court held that trust funds to be
applied to the construction of an exempt building were exempt from
taxation. In South Iowa, as stipulated by the parties, the property in controversy would be exempt when the building was completed and occupied.' 6 If exemption were denied, use of exempt
funds to build an exempt building would not preclude taxation
during the construction period. The dissent attempted to distinguish the Huenke case on the grounds that Huenke dealt with a section of the exemption statute' 7 dealing with moneys and credits
and placing stress upon the ownership of the trust funds. 18 The
court in Huenke based its decision on the fact that although the
hospital had not yet been constructed, the trust funds were firmly
committed and could not be diverted from the purpose of constructing the hospital. While this distinction appears valid, it seems
equally clear that when a charity has partially completed construction of a building a firm commitment would be present from which,
in the ordinary course of events, the charity would not be
diverted.
Another anomaly arises out of the fact that when a charity
has purchased a building (already fit for use) to be used for an
12. E.g., Cornell College v. Board of Review, 248 Iowa 338, 81 N.W.2d
25 (1957); Trustees of Iowa College v. Baillie, 236 Iowa 235, 17 N.W.2d 143
(1945); Wagner v. Board of Review, 232 Iowa 58, 4 N.W.2d 405 (1942).
13. See McGlone v. First Baptist Church of Denver, 97 Colo. 427, 50
P.2d 547 (1935); El Jebel Shrine Ass'n v. McGlone, 93 Colo. 334, 26 P.2d
108 (1933).
14. 136 N.W.2d at 491.
15. 250 Iowa 1030, 98 N.W.2d 7 (1959).
16. 136 N.W.2d at 489.
17. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 427.1(10) (1949).
18. 136 N.W.2d at 494 (dissenting opinion).
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"appropriate object" such property can qualify for exemption before July 1 of the tax year. 19 If exemption were denied under the
present facts, property on which a building was completed by July
1 would be taxable at its value on the assessment date. The South
Iowa court states: "While these results may not reach the stage of
being absurd0 or ridiculous, they certainly are inconsistent, unjust
'2
and unfair.
Before turning to the cases considered by the court, it is necessary to examine briefly the rationale behind the exemption of charitable property from taxation. It has been said that "the fundamental ground upon which all such exemptions are based is a benefit
conferred on the public by such institutions, and a consequent relief, to some extent of the burden upon the state to care for and advance the interests of its citizens."' 2 ' The benefits derived by the
public from charitable institutions far outweigh the trivial inequality caused by an exemption of their property. 22 Furthermore, in
the absence of private charity, the state would be obliged to carry
out these functions with the result that the tax burden would be
increased to provide revenues for these additional activities. It
would seem therefore that exemption of charitable property is not
merely a favor conferred upon charities by the state. It is based on
sound reasoning and is in the best interests of the state:
It is obvious that the welfare exemption is designed to serve
both social and economic ends. The electors of the state
must be deemed to have been aware of the need of the
services afforded by the designated organizations when
carried on impartially without self-interest. Implicit in the
legislation is the knowledge that the maintenance of the
facilities and the dispensation of the services as a result of
private contributions of funds and personal effort become
less of a burden on the taxpaying public than would be the
19. IOWA CODE ANN. § 427.1(25) (1949).
This section provides:
In any case where no such claim for exemption has been made to
the assessor prior to the time his books are completed, such claims
may be filed with the local board of review or with the county
auditor not later than July first (lst) of the year for which such
exemption from taxation is claimed, and a proper assessment shall
be made either by the board of review or by the county auditor,
if such property is all or in part subject to taxation.

Essentially the same result was reached prior to this statutory provi-

sion by case decision. Iowa Wesleyan College v. Knight, 207 Iowa 1238,
224 N.W. 502 (1929).
20. 136 N.W.2d at 490.
21. Book Agents of Methodist Episcopal Church, South v. Hinton, 92
Tenn. 188, 190, 21 S.W. 321, 322 (1892).
22. Brenau Ass'n v. Harbison, 120 Ga. 929, 48 S.E. 363 (1904) (dictum).
The dissent in South Iowa questioned whether the inequalities caused by
the shifting of the tax burden were in fact "trivial." It would seem
doubtful in view of the insatiable demands for revenue by the state and
the increase of property exempt from taxation. The charitable exemption
is firmly established, however, and as long as this is the case it seems the
policies behind such exemption should be given full effect.
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23
cost under public ownership and control.
A lesser tax burden enables the charity to make its services more
widely available. The resulting reduction in cost to the charity is
deemed a greater benefit to the public than would be a decrease of
the public tax burden if such property were not exempt. 24 Tax
exemption of charitable property is a recognition of the benefits
society receives from the work carried on by the charities. South
Iowa involves the determination of that point at which the property
of a charitable institution begins to fulfill the purposes for which
exemption is granted. Inherent in the conclusion reached in South
Iowa is the fact that exemptions are provided to aid charities in the
formation as well as the continuation of the property utilized in
providing charity.
Several jurisdictions utilize a strict construction of their exemption statutes. In arriving at opposite conclusions, the cases
illustrate the dichotomy existing as to the exemption of property in
the course of construction, which concededly would be exempt
when completed and used.
In Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. v. Los Angeles County,25 the California court refused to grant exemption to a nearly completed student nurses residence. Admittedly the building would be exempt
when completed and used. The statute provided for exemption of
property "used exclusively"26 for exempt purposes. The court
said that "such express limitation, making use the focal point of
consideration, contemplates actual use, as differentiated from an
intention to use the property in a designated manner. '27 The California court went on to say that even if the statute was not to be
limited by the doctrine of strict construction, under no theory of
course of construction be
construction could a building in the
28
viewed as being used for any purpose.
Pennsylvania has adhered closely to the view expressed in the
Cedars case. Dougherty v. City of Philadelphia29 construed the
30
The
exemption statute requiring "actual use and occupation."
in
building,
school
new
that
a
held
Court
Pennsylvania Supreme
course of erection on a newly purchased lot which had never been
exempt from taxation, was not entitled to exemption. The same
result was reached when a building was completed and used before

23.

Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal.2d 729,

750-51, 221 P.2d 31, 41 (1950)

(dissenting opinion).

24. Ibid.
25. 35 Cal.2d 729, 221 P.2d 31 (1950).
26. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 214.
27. 35 Cal.2d at 742, 221 P.2d at 39.
28. Ibid.
29. 112 Pa. Super. 570, 172 Atl. 177 (1934).
30. Pa. Laws 1919, act 1021, § 1, as amended by Pa. Laws 1925, act
388, § 1. The same requirements are now found in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72,
§ 5020-204(1) (Supp. 1964).
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the end of the tax year.3 ' This line of reasoning, however, has been
abandoned in at least three instances.
The first exception is found in Dougherty itself. The taxpayer
in that case also owned a lot adjacent to the non-exempt land and
had maintained a school building on this land for a number of years.
During this period the land and building had been exempt. The old
building was then razed and construction was begun on a new
building. The Pennsylvania court said that this property was not
subject to taxation since the temporary absence of actual use did
not destroy the original
exemption which had attached to the land
2
and the old building.3
A second exception was recognized in Appeal of Children's
33
Hosp. of Philadelphia
in which the court held that land upon
which a hospital addition was being built was entitled to exemption.
This land had been previously exempted on the basis that it was
necessary to the proper utilization of the original hospital building.
In this case the court propounded an interesting question when it
asked: "Would anyone contend that if a hospital burned to the
ground, that the ground on which a new structure was being built
and the uncompleted building itself, would be subject to taxa-

tion ?,34
This question was answered in Summerfield Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of Philadelphia3 wherein the court held that
when a church building had been destroyed by fire, the property
was exempted from taxation during the time it took to construct
a new building.
31. Jewish Maternity Ass'n v. Philadelphia, 24 Pa. Dist. 307 (C.P.
1915).
32. 112 Pa. Super. at 575-77, 172 Atl. 179-80 (dictum). The court
held, however, that as part of the premises for which exemption was
claimed was not exempt, the bill had to be dismissed.
33. 82 Pa. Super. 196 (1923). The court held that since the land had
been exempted previously and would soon be "used" for charitable purposes again, the fact that it was temporarily not being "used" for charitable purposes while it was under construction did not make the property

subject to taxation. Two hypothetical situations show the arbitrary and

anomalous results obtained under the Dougherty and Children's cases:
XYZ Hospital owns a parking lot across the street from the main hospital
building which is exempt from taxation. Thereafter XYZ Hospital ceases
to use the lot for parking and begins construction of an additional building
on the lot. Under the Children's and Dougherty cases, the property would
be exempt during the course of construction. Now if XYZ Hospital purchased a parking lot across the street which had previously been privately
owned and operated and not exempt from taxation, the property would

be taxable while the building was in course of construction under the

Dougherty decision.

In both situations the same building is being built

for the same charitable purposes, yet under one set of facts the property
is exempt and under the other it is taxable.
34.

35.

Id. at 198 (dictum).

88 Pa. D. & C. 134 (C.P. 1954). This case dealt with a church
building, but the same reasoning would appear to be applicable to chari-

table property as stated by the dictum in the Children's case.
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It may be summarily stated that in Pennsylvania charitable
property in the course of construction will be exempt from taxation
if the land had been used previously for an exempt purpose and the
cessation of actual use is limited to situations involving repair,
restoration, or enlargement. As to the issue presented in South
Iowa, however, Pennsylvania would probably deny exemption.
New Jersey similarly denied exemption to property in the
course of construction under its exemption statute requiring that
the property be "actually used. ' 36 Carrying the requirement to a
"drily logical" extreme, the court denied exemption to a home for
the elderly which had been completed but not occupied and used
37
before the assessment date.
In rejecting the "actual use" doctrine, evident in the Pennsylvania and New Jersey cases, the Iowa court distinguished these
cases on the ground that the Pennsylvania and New Jersey statutes
were more stringent than the Iowa statute. The court obviously
preferred the dissent in the Cedars case. An examination of the
decisions reveals the basic elements which have led the courts to
adopt the "actual use" test rejected in South Iowa.
The rule of strict construction of exemption statutes presents
the most ominous barrier to exemption of charitable property while
under construction. The reasoning supporting this rule is that
exemptions are provided only by the grace of the sovereign power. 38
The granting of such grace. is viewed as an appropriation of public
funds. To the extent that certain property is exempt from taxation
it is necessary to increase the rate of taxation on other properties to
provide the funds necessary to carry on the functions of the government. 39 The granting of an exemption is in effect a restraint of
sovereign power and as such must be strictly construed against
those receiving such concession. Courts have frequently applied
the rule of strict construction where the argument for exemption
36. See Institute of Holy Angels v. Borough of Ft. Lee, 80 N.J.L. 545,
77 Atl. 1035 (Sup. Ct. 1910), construing N.J. Laws 1903, act 394. The present requirement that property be "actually and exclusively used" is found
in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4 - 3.6 (Supp. 1964).
37. Borough of Longport v. Max & Sarah Bamberger Seashore Home,
91 N.J.L. 330, 102 Atl. 633 (Ct. Err. & App. 1917) (per curiam). This case
was distinguished in Trenton Ladies Sick Benefit Soc'y v. City of Trenton,
19 N.J. Misc. 176, 17 A.2d 809 (B.T.A. 1941), where a home for the aged
erected by a charitable organization had been completed and had opened
its doors prior to the assessment date. No applications were received before the assessment date. The court granted the exemption and, in distinguishing the Bamberger case, said that there the home was not yet
ready for applications even though fully constructed.
38. Town of Milford v. Comm'r of Worcester County, 213 Mass. 162,
165, 100 N.E. 60, 62 (1912).
39. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. Inhabitants of Belmont, 233 Mass. 190,
124 N.E. 21 (1919). See ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF CHARITIES, §§ 686-696

(1924), which discusses the rule of strict construction and the rule of liberal construction of exemption statutes.
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has been highly persuasive. 40 Dissenters, on the other hand, have
called for exemption in these cases under a "strict but reasonable"
interpretation:
It is no answer to say that in such cases the policy was one
of liberal construction. Under the 'strict but reasonable'
formula announced the result should be the same. When
an exemption appears under that rule of construction, the
'reasonable' application of the exemption language in my
with the general
opinion requires a result in conformity
41
rule accepted in the foregoing cases.
Pennsylvania has on occasion been compelled to retreat from
the results of strict construction where there has been a prior use
of the land for exempt purposes. Thus, in Dougherty42 the taxpayer claimed exemption for two adjacent lots. On each lot an old
building had been razed and a new building erected. It seems
illogical that the court should have come to opposite conclusions
with respect to the tax status of the two lots. Under a strict
construction of the exemption statute, neither propery was being
actually used at the time of the assessment since both buildings
were in the course of construction.
In any event, while many cases can be said to turn on this difference between strict and liberal construction, it would seem that
the specific statutory language of exemption statutes presents an
equally limiting effect on the exemption of charitable property in
course of construction. State v. Fisher43 dealt with a statute which
required property to be "used" 44 for charitable purposes. The New
Jersey court, while denying exemption under the facts, questioned
what the result would have been if actual preparation had been
commenced toward use of the property. In Institute of Holy Angels
v. Borough of Ft. Lee,45 however, the court said this question had
'46
been rendered moot by the insertion of the words "actually used
40. See Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal.2d
729, 221 P.2d 31 (1950); Dougherty v. City of Philadelphia, 112 Pa. Super.

570, 172 At. 177 (1924). Some of the principles applicable under the rule
of strict construction of tax exemption statutes are evident in the Pennsylvania decisions. Thus a claimant of exemption from taxation must show
affirmative legislation in support of his claim and must show that his case
is clearly within it. Dougherty v. City of Philadelphia, 314 Pa. 298, 171
Atl. 583 (1934). Furthermore the statute creating the exemption must be
strictly construed against the taxpayer and if the right to exemption is
doubtful, the doubt must be construed in favor of taxation. Harrisburg v.
Cemetary Ass'n, 30 Dauph. 302, 9 Pa. D. & C. 773 (C.P. 1927).

41.
221 P.2d
42.
43.
44.
erty be
54:4-3.6
45.
46.

Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal.2d at 754,
at 46 (dissenting opinion).
112 Pa. Super. 570, 172 Atl. 177 (1934).
68 N.J.L. 143, 52 Atl. 228 (Sup. Ct. 1902).
N.J. Laws 1886, act 1078. The present requirement that the prop"actually and exclusively used" is found in N.J. STAT. ANN. §
(Supp. 1964).
80 N.J.L. 545, 77 Atl. 1035 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
N.J. Laws 1903, act 394. The present requirement that property

NOTES
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in place of "used" and that a building under construction, intended
for an exempt use, was not exempt until so used. These two cases
illustrate that the New Jersey court was at least aware of a possible
difference in results had the statute in the Holy Angels case required only "use" rather than "actual use."
Underlying the formation of charitable exemption statutes in
terms of actual use is the theory that such exemptions are granted
on a quid pro quo basis.47 Under this theory there is no basis
upon which to predicate exemption until society is actually reaping
the benefits that enure from a charitable use of property. This is a
manifestation of the view that private charities relieve the state
of a burden which it would otherwise have to carry on. In return
for these services, the state relieves the charities of the tax burden.
It is this traditional concept that leads legislatures to frame exemption statutes in terms of use. Such statutes, together with the rule
of strict construcion, preclude the flexibility needed to resolve situations which do not meet the set legal standards, but which in
terms of logic, fairness and justice warrant a less stringent test.
Another well established basis for the doctrine of "actual use"
is the judicial reluctance to extend exemption to mere charitable
intentions. The Cedars court said:
It is argued that some effect should be given to these factors: that the exemption here is sought for property on
which considerable progress had already been made with
the building, that Work was being diligently prosecuted,
and upon its completion it was in fact used pursuant to its
design for an exempt purpose-as distinguished from a
claim made with respect to vacant land on which it is the
intention to start construction at some future date. But
these considerations attesting to the exercise of the institution's good faith in carrying out its building program are

wholly immaterial ...

.48

The dissent in South Iowa expressed the fear that such intentions
be "actually and exclusively used" is found in N.J.
(Supp. 1964).
47.

As stated by one court:

"...

STAT. ANN.

§ 54:4-3.6

and it is only in those cases where

the property is put to some use calculated to minimize the expenses of
government that public policy justifies an exemption." Medical So c'y of
Kings County v. Neff, 34 App. Div. 83, 85, 53 N.Y. Supp. 1077, 1079 (Sup.
Ct. App. Div. 1898). This theory was later rejected in New York where

the court said:
There is no more ground for holding that an educational corporation receives its tax exemption upon the principle of non-taxa-

tion of public places, and as a 'quid pro quo' etc., than a like
holding as to exemptions made to religious and charitable, etc.,
corporations.
Application of Thomas S. Clarkson Memorial College of Technology, 274
App. Div. 732, 87 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1949). See Note, Tax Exemption of Charitable Property, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 724 (1931-32).

48. 35 Cal.2d at 743, 221 P.2d at 40.
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may never be carried out. 49 Thus the exemption having been granted, the tax revenue is lost forever.
Rejecting the "actual use" doctrine, the South Iowa court
adopted instead the more liberal view expressed in Village of
Hibbing v. Commissioner of Taxation.50 This approach utilizes the
"intention to use" doctrine in arriving at the conclusion that charitable property in course of construction is exempt from taxation.
The Hibbing court granted exemption to a building being remodeled and fitted to a charitable use:
[T] he right to exemption depends upon the concurrence of
the institution's ownership and use of the property as a
public hospital. The right of exemption carries with it, as
an incident, a reasonable opportunity by an institution entitled to tax exemption of its property, in execution of an
intention so to do, to adapt and fit property acquired by it
for the use upon which the right of exemption rests. 51
This view has also been adopted in New York. The court there
had held that the real property of a charitable corporation was
exempt from taxation, though not in actual use because of the absence of suitable buildings, where the erection of such buildings
was contemplated in good faith. 52 Texas has also exempted property of charitable institutions during bona fide preparation for ac53
tual operation.
The "intention to use" doctrine is based on the premise that
once a charitable institution expends money and does work on a
program designed to result in the use of property for charitable
purposes, the statutory requirements are satisfied and the property
is within the objects of the exemption provisions. 54 In adopting this
49. 136 N.W.2d at 494-95 (dissenting opinion).
50. 217 Minn. 528, 14 N.W.2d 923 (1944). The dissent in South Iowa
contended that the case was not in point since the main question before
the court was the sufficiency of equitable ownership as a basis for tax
exemption. The exemption of property being adopted and fitted for
charitable use, however, was very much in issue. No attempt to distinguish
the case on the basis that it did not involve the erection of a building, but
merely adoptation of an existing building, can be validly supported in view
of the language of the court in providing for exemption of charitable
property during the time necessary to fit acquired property to charitable
use.
51. Id. at 535, 14 N.W.2d at 926-27 (emphasis added).
52. In re Miriam Osborn Memorial Home Ass'n, 140 N.Y. Supp. 786
(Sup. Ct. 1912). The charitable organization had frequently discussed a
building program and had set up a fund for such purposes.
53. See Hedgecroft v. City of Houston, 150 Tex. 654, 244 S.W.2d 632
(1952), wherein it was held that property acquired for use as a hospital

and a clinic was exempt not only during the period of actual operation,
but also during the period in which preparations necessary to ready the
premises for actual operation were being made.
54. See, e.g., McGlone v. First Baptist Church of Denver, 97 Colo. 427,
50 P.2d 547 (1935); El Jebel Shrine Ass'n v. McGlone, 93 Colo. 334, 26 P.2d

108 (1933).
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view, the Iowa court has recognized that where a building is actually in the course of erection, the property is entitled to exemption. This holding signifies a somewhat restrained adoption of the
"intention to use" doctrine. Other states have gone so far as to
hold that the buying of land and the drawing up of plans, 55 the
breaking of land,56 and the destruction of a building for the purpose of constructing a new one 57 constitute such a bona fide intention as to qualify for exemption.
When evaluating the Iowa court's decision, it must be remembered that the exemption statute was designed to encourage charitable institutions to devote their land to charitable uses.58 It is
submitted that, while the "actual use" doctrine does aid charitable
institutions in their endeavors, it is not until facilities are completed that the charity receives any benefit whatsoever. The "actual use" doctrine lacks the necessary inducement for expanding
facilities and establishing new facilities. This observation takes on
added significance when it is noted that many exemption statutes
provide that all revenues taken in by charities from the use of exempt lands must be used for the maintenance, repair and necessary
increase of facilities.5 9 As stated by the dissent in Cedars:
Expansion is necessary to keep abreast of increased public
need due to population and other changes. Under modern
conditions, neither a hospital nor any other welfare service can remain static. If the trust funds, contributions and
earnings are tax exempt, no good reason requires a denial
of exemption because of the temporary use of assets to construction purposes, where the property in its converted
state is also exempt.60
The court in South Iowa reasoned that to tax the charity when
it was seeking to expand or build facilities would not be within the
spirit of tax exemption statutes. 61 Furthermore, since charities
carry on their programs by relying heavily on public contributions
55.

See Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church

v. Board of Assessors, 244 N.Y. 42, 154 N.E. 816 (1926). Contra, City and
County of Denver v. George Washington Lodge Ass'n, 121 Colo. 470, 217
P.2d 617 (1950), where an architect had prepared first sketch of a building
and the realty had been rezoned to permit erection of building.
56. El Jebel Shrine Ass'n v. McGlone, 93 Colo. 334, 26 P.2d 108 (1933)

(Construction of foundation).
57. McGlone v. First Baptist Church of Denver, 97 Colo. 427, 50 P.2d
547 (1935). Contra, Dougherty v. City of Philadelphia, 112 Pa. Super. 570,
172 Atl. 177 (1934) (by implication).
58. 136 N.W.2d at 490.
59. See PA. STAT. AN. tit. 72, § 5020-204(c) (Supp. 1964), which requires that "the entire revenue derived by the same be applied to the support and to increase the efficiency and facilities thereof, the repair and
the necessary increase of grounds and buildings thereof, and for no other
purpose." See also N.J. STAT. ANx. § 54:4-3.6 (Supp. 1964).
60. 35 Cal.2d at 753, 221 P.2d at 46 (dissenting opinion).
61. 136 N.W.2d at 490.
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it would appear illogical to reclaim such contributions in the form
of taxes.
As noted, the dissent argued that too often the avowed intentions of charities go awry, that there is no assurance the building
will ever be completed, or if completed, that it will be used for
charitable purposes. 2 This contention poses a serious problem
which has not been adequately resolved by the states adopting the
"intention to use" theory.
In final analysis, the court's determination rested on the adoption of one of two cases: the Hibbing case 63 which represents the
"intention to use" doctrine or the Cedars case6 4 adopting the
"actual use" doctrine.
The efficacy of Cedars was certainly to be doubted in light of
subsequent events. After Cedars the California legislature proposed an amendment to the constitution and an additional section to
the exemption statute which resulted in exemption for charitable
facilities in the course of construction. 65 When viewed along with
the strong dissent in Cedars, the similarity in the statutory language involved, 66 and the harshness of the Cedars conclusion, it is
conceivable that the court was hesitant to adopt-a line of reasoning
subsequently changed by the legislature. The dissent objected to
this analysis of Cedars, noting that the legislature may say what the
law shall be, not what it is or has been.6 7 While this argument
seems sound, it overlooks the main purpose of the Iowa court in
looking at decisions from other jurisdictions. The value of the
Cedars case was not whether the case was correctly decided, but
whether or not the reasons underlying the decision were applicable
to the issue before the Iowa court. Thus the value of the case came
not only from the decision reached but also from the subsequent
action of the legislature based on the result thus reached.
Even more significant, however, is the fact that the Iowa legislature, as previously noted, had passed a statutory amendment not
in effect at the time this controversy arose. The amendment exempted property under the statute during the course of construc62.
63.
64.
65.

136 N.W.2d at 494-95 (dissenting opinion).
217 Minn. 528, 14 N.W.2d 923 (1944).
35 Cal.2d 729, 221 P.2d 31 (1950).
CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 214.1. This section provides that as used

in § 214,
Property used exclusively for religious, hospital, or charitable purposes shall include facilities in the course of construction . . . together with the land on which the facilities are located .... "
tionThe statute took effect the first Monday of March 1954. The cons
ality of this statute was contingent upon the passage of an amendment to
the California constitution. The constitutional amendment was adopted at
the general elections on November 2, 1954.
66. Compare IOWA CODE ANN. § 427.1(9) (1949) ("used . . . solely")
with CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 214 ("used exclusively").
67. South Iowa Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Board of Review, Iowa

136 N.W.2d at 493-94 (dissenting opinion).
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tion. 68 With the issue thus rendered moot in the future by this
amendment, the court may have been reluctant to deny exemption
where it was so clearly enunciated that the legislature felt such
property should be exempt. In any event, it is submitted that the
court in South Iowa has reached a just result.
In conclusion, it would appear that charitable property in
course of construction should be exempt from taxation where such
property will be exempt when completed and occupied. A strict
construction of exemption statutes does not require an unreasonable
result. The rule of strict construction does not require that "the
narrowest possible meaning be given to words descriptive of exemption, for a fair and reasonable interpretation must be made of
all laws, with due regard for the ordinary acceptation of the language employed and the object sought to be accomplished thereby." 69 When the construction given to a statute proves to be in
derogation of the admitted purposes of that statute, it should be
the rule of construction which retreats and not the objects of the
statute. If the statute is designed to encourage the formation and
proper growth of charities as well as to maintain their existence, no
rule of construction should stand in the way. Statutes which are
especially difficult to construe in favor of exemption for facilities
in course of erection7 0 might be replaced with language more susceptible to providing the needed flexibility to meet such issues.
Perhaps the preferable result would be obtained by following
"use"7 1 but specifically exCalifornia's solution which requires
72
erection.
of
course
in
empts facilities
68.

IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 427.1(9)

(Supp. 1965).

§

427.1(9) (1949)

as amended by IOWA CODE ANN.

The amendment was approved on June 4, 1965

and will take effect July 4, 1966.
69. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal.2d at 735,
221 P.2d at 35. See COOLEY, TAXATION, § 674 (4th ed. 1924).
70. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, § 5020-204(1) (Supp. 1964) ("actual use
and occupation"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (Supp. 1964). ("actually and
exclusively used").

71.

CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE

§ 214.

72. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 214.1. It should be noted, however that
as in California, such a solution may require not only a statutory change
but also a constitutional amendment. Pennsylvania serves as a good example. In Mullen v. Commissioners of Erie County, 85 Pa. 288 (1877),
affirming Erie County Commissioners v. Bishop, 13 Phila. 509 (1877), it
was held that under the Act of May 14, 1874, P.L. 158, land upon which a

church was in the course of construction was not exempt from taxation.
To remedy the result reached in this case, the Act of June 4, 1879, P.L. 90,
was passed. This Act provided that:
Nothing in the act to which this is a supplement shall be taken as
implying that any building, though incomplete or in the course of
construction shall be subject to taxation, where said building was
intended under provision of said act, to be exempt from taxation
when completed.
The Act of June 4, 1879, P.L. 90 was declared unconstitutional in Pittsburgh
v. Phelan, 11 Pa. Dist. 572 (C.P. 1901), as far as church property was concerned since the constitution provided that such property, in order to be
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Finally, the fear expressed by the dissent 73 as to whether
charitable intentions will ever be carried out can easily be provided
for, thereby meeting one objection to the "intention to use" doctrine.
For example, the land and partially completed building could be
taxed, with a refund provided when the building is actually completed and used. Alternatively, the charity could post a bond in the
amount of the taxes which would lapse when "actual use" commenced.
In order to prevent abuse, however, exemption of facilities in
course of construction should be limited by a requirement that the
work be carried out and the building be put in use within a reasonable time.74 Furthermore only a bona fide intention, that is an
intention manifested by the actual expenditure of money and carrying on of work, would appear to deserve exemption. The mere
holding of land by a charitable institution, or purely nominal acts
toward construction should not be sufficient.
RUDOLPH ZIEGER, JR.

exempt, must be an actual place of religious worship. The court in Jewish
Maternity Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 24 Pa. Dist. 307, 309 (C.P. 1915),

in denying exemption to a hospital which was in course of construction
at assessment date held that the Act of June 4, 1879, P.L. 90 was in conflict
with the constitution as an expository act attempting to constrain the court
to adopt a particular construction of a previously enacted statute and an
"attempt to exempt a species of property which does not fall within any
of the classes which the legislature is empowered to exempt." Thus the
act was declared unconstitutional in its entirety, both as to religious property and charitable property.
73. South Iowa Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Board of Review, 136 N.W.2d
at 494-95 (dissenting opinion).
74. See Village of Hibbing v. Comm'r of Taxation, 217 Minn. 528, 535,
14 N.W.2d 923, 926-27 (1944). Such a reasonable time limit would include
the flexibility apparent in El Jebel Shrine Ass'n v. McGlone, 92 Colo. 334,
26 P.2d 108 (1933) in which the court recognized that the world-wide de-

pression had prevented the completion of many similar buildings.

